

## Message Text

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ORIGIN PA-04

INFO OCT-01 CCO-00 RSC-01 SS-20 SSO-00 ISO-00 PRS-01

NSCE-00 NSC-07 /034 R

DRAFTED BY PA/M:HBREARD:SAC

APPROVED BY PA/M:FWISNER

S/S-O:RELTZ

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

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O 062147Z JUL 74 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMCONSUL MUNICH IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS STATE 146151

TOSEC 377

E.O. 11652: NA

TAGS. OVIP (KISSINGER)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HEREWITH FULL TEXT MICHAEL GETLER BYLINER, WASHINGTON POST, 7/6/74, HEADLINED: "LACK OF NEW LIMIT ON WEAPONS THREATENS TO EXPAND ARMS RACE."

2. THE FAILURE OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT TO REACH NEW AGREEMENTS ON THE CRITICAL QUESTION OF LIMITING OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS THREATENS TO BRING ABOUT AN EXPANDED ARMS RACE WHICH WOULD LEAVE BOTH SUPERPOWERS WITH STILL HIGHER LEVELS OF EXPENSIVE ARMAMENTS WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVANTAGE OVER ONE ANOTHER.

3. DESPITE PRESIDENT NIXON'S ASSERTION THAT THE SUMMIT MOVED "THE PROCESS OF PEACE STEADILY FORWARD," THE LACK OF NEW ARMS LIMITATIONS THREATENS PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT AND CONFIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY OF DETENTE WITH THE SOVIETS.

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4. THESE ARE THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED PRIVATELY BY A NUMBER OF SENIOR U.S. OFFICIALS REFLECTING ON THE RESULTS OF THE MOSCOW SUMMIT MEETING COMPLETED EARLIER THIS WEEK.

5. WHAT WORRIES OFFICIALS SPECIFICALLY IS THIS:

6. BY ALL ACCOUNTS, THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN LITTLE IF ANY WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON THE MAJOR ISSUE OF LIMITING THEIR DEPLOYMENT OF NEW MIRV-TYPE MULTIPLE WARHEAD MISSILES TO REPLACE EXISTING SINGLE-WARHEAD VERSIONS.

7. WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS, THE RUSSIANS ARE EXPECTED TO BEGIN DEPLOYING THESE MISSILES. WITH NO INDICATION AS TO WHETHER THEY WILL CONVERT ALL 1,400 OR SO LAND-BASED MISSILES THEY HAVE INTO MIRV-CARRYING WEAPONS, THE PUBLIC IMPACT IN THIS COUNTRY WHEN THAT DEPLOYMENT STARTS IS GOING TO BE SIGNIFICANT, OFFICIALS ESTIMATE.

8. IT WILL ERODE CONFIDENCE IN DETENTE, ALREADY DAMAGED BY SOVIET ACTIVITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST OCTOBER WAR, AND MAKE IT EASIER FOR THE PENTAGON TO GET APPROVAL FOR THE NEW WEAPONS IT WANTS TO DEVELOP AS A COUNTER.

9. THIS YEAR, EVEN BEFORE THE SUMMIT, CONGRESS APPROVED A START ON SOME OF THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL NEW WEAPONS PROPOSED IN YEARS, INCLUDING A PROGRAM, CONSISTENTLY REJECTED IN THE PAST, TO IMPROVE THE ACCURACY OF U.S. MISSILES.

10. WITH NO AGREEMENT AT THE SUMMIT AND NEW SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENTS UNDER WAY, CONGRESS IS NOT APT TO INCREASE ITS CHALLENGE TO THE PENTAGON NEXT YEAR.

11. SOME OFFICIALS THINK THE SOVIETS ARE BETTING THAT CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC--FACING SERIOUS INFLATION--WILL NOT SUSTAIN THE NEW U.S. ARMS PROGRAMS.

12. BUT MOST BELIEVE THE SOVIETS HAVE MADE A SERIOUS MIS-JUDGMENT; THAT THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT ONLY ACCEPT DEFENSE SECRETARY JAMES R. SCHLESINGER'S PLEDGE TO "MATCH" THE SOVIETS IF NECESSARY, BUT THAT THE ENSUING AMERICAN UNCLASSIFIED

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EFFORT AND SUPERIOR U.S. TECHNOLOGY WILL LEAVE THE RUSSIANS FURTHER BEHIND IN THE RELATIVE BALANCE OF POWER.

13. EITHER WAY, THE DEPLOYMENT OF A NEW ROUND OF RUSSIAN MISSILES--WHICH SCHLESINGER HAS ESTIMATED MIGHT COST THEM AS MUCH AS \$45 BILLION TO COMPLETE--AND AN EXPENSIVE AMERICAN REJOINDER IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO MEAN GREATER DIFFICULTY AT A NEW ROUND OF ARMS NEGOTIATIONS STARTING LATER

THIS YEAR.

14. SOURCES CLOSE TO THE RECENT NEGOTIATIONS SAY THAT THE LACK OF COMPROMISE IN THE SOVIET POSITION WITH RESPECT TO SCALING DOWN THE SOVIET UNION'S PROSPECTIVE MIRV DEPLOYMENT DID NOT EVEN TEST THE DIFFERENCES WHICH HAVE GROWN UP WITHIN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION OVER WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ACCEPTABLE ARMS DEAL.

15. THESE SOURCES SAY THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSALS NEVER EVEN HIT THE AREA OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY A. KISSINGER AND SCHLESINGER.

16. KISSINGER, IN GENERAL, IS KNOWN TO FEEL THAT THE SOVIETS SIMPLY WILL NOT ACCEPT MAJOR CONSTRAINTS ON THEIR MIRV PROGRAM, AN AREA WHERE THEY ARE CURRENTLY INFERIOR TO THE UNITED STATES, BUT THAT SOME STEP AT LEAST TO REDUCE THE LEVEL OF MIRV MISSILES AND KEEP THE MOMENTUM OF ARMS ACCORDS GOING IS WORTH TAKING.

17. SCHLESINGER LEANS TOWARD THE VIEW THAT MAJOR CONSTRAINT IS NECESSARY ON THE PART OF THE SOVIETS AND THAT MERELY CAPPING THE DEPLOYMENT AT HIGH LEVELS OF PERHAPS MORE THAN 600 TO 700 MIRVED MISSILES WILL NOT SNAP THE MOMENTUM OF THE ARMS RACE.

18. WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE DOING, THE PENTAGON ARGUES, IS EXPLOITING THE NUMERICAL ADVANTAGE IN MISSILE NUMBERS THEY WERE ALLOWED IN THE INITIAL 1972 ARMS AGREEMENTS TO COMPENSATE FOR THE U.S. LEAD IN MIRVS AND WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY. AS THE RUSSIANS ACQUIRE THE TECHNOLOGY, THEY MUST NOW CONSTRAIN THE NUMERICAL SIZE OF THEIR FORCE TO UNCLASSIFIED

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PRESERVE "ESSENTIAL EQUIVALENCE."

19. WITHIN THE PENTAGON HIERARCHY, THERE IS DISQUIET OVER THE TOUGH SOVIET POSITION AND A FEELING THAT THE U.S. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX SUFFERS FROM CONSTANT PUBLIC SCRUTINY, COMPARED WITH THE SECRECY OF SOVIET MILITARY DECISIONS.

20. ON THE OTHER HAND, PENTAGON OFFICIALS EXPRESS SATISFACTION THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT MAKE ANY DEALS AT THE SUMMIT THAT COULD HAVE BEEN JUSTIFIED ONLY AS PROMOTING DETENTE RATHER THAN ON NATIONAL SECURITY GROUNDS.

21. WITHOUT HIS DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, SEVERAL OFFICIALS BELIEVE, KISSINGER'S VIEWS WOULD HAVE PREVAILED AND ANY

RESULTING ARMS PACT WOULD HAVE BEEN MORE LIKELY TO GAIN CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

22. THUS, FOR THE TIME BEING AT LEAST, THERE SEEMS TO BE AN ALLIANCE OF CONVENIENCE BETWEEN THE PENTAGON AND THE PRESIDENT.

23. DESPITE SCHLESINGER'S ASSERTION AT A PRESS CONFERENCE WEDNESDAY THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD IN FACT WORKED OUT AN "UNDERSTANDING ACROSS THIS ADMINISTRATION OF A GENERAL APPROACH" TO BE TAKEN IN MOSCOW, THERE IS NO QUESTION THAT SCHLESINGER AND KISSINGER ARE IN DISAGREEMENT OVER THE NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUE.

24. WHAT IS NOT KNOWN, BECAUSE NO SPECIFIC NUMBERS HAVE BEEN REVEALED TO INDICATE THE LEVEL OF SOVIET MIRVS THAT EITHER ONE WOULD FIND ACCEPTABLE, IS THE DEPTH OF THE DIFFERENCES.

25. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ARE SAID TO BE "JUST TO THE RIGHT" OF SCHLESINGER'S POSITION, BUT THEIR VIEW AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY CREATE PRESSURE ON THE PRESIDENT IS GENERALLY SAID TO BE EXAGGERATED.

26. THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DID HAVE A HAND IN "RAISING THE THRESHOLD" AT WHICH A SOVIET DEAL WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO UNCLASSIFIED

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THE ADMINISTRATION, SOURCES SAY, BUT THERE WAS STILL NO HARMONIOUS, GOVERNMENT-WIDE POSITION AT MOSCOW.

27. SCHLESINGER IS ALSO KNOWN TO CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT THE LARGER LIFTING-POWER, OR THROW-WEIGHT, OF THE SOVIET MISSILES BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. THIS AFFECTS HOW MANY INDIVIDUAL WARHEADS CAN BE PUT ON A MISSILE. ALL THE NEW SOVIET MISSILES NOW BEING TESTED ARE LARGER THAN THEIR U.S. COUNTERPARTS.

28. TO SUGGESTIONS THAT THE UNITED STATES COULD ALSO BUILD BIGGER MISSILES IF NECESSARY, SCHLESINGER, SOURCES SAY, ARGUES THAT THE OVERALL GROWTH IN LIFTING-POWER ON BOTH SIDES IS WHAT MUST BE CONTROLLED IF THE FEAR THAT ONE SIDE WILL BE ABLE TO STRIKE AN OPPONENT'S MISSILE FORCE SUCCESSIVELY, OR EVEN HAVE THE APPEARANCE OF A SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGE, IS TO BE REMOVED.

29. U.S. OFFICIALS CONCEDE THAT AT THIS POINT THE PENTAGON IS OFFERING THE SOVIETS, IN RETURN FOR ITS RESTRAINT, ONLY THE WILLINGNESS TO RESTRAIN WHAT HAPPENS IN THIS COUNTRY IN A NEW ROUND OF WEAPONS WORK.

30. THUS, IF THE SOVIETS HOLD DOWN THEIR MIRV LEVEL, THE UNITED STATES WILL STOP THE PRODUCTION LINE OF THE MINUTE-MAN III MISSILE AND END THE PROSPECTS FOR MIRVING THE ENTIRE 1,000-MISSILE MINUTEMAN FORCE RATHER THAN THE 550 NOW DEPLOYED OR PLANNED. ALSO, THE UNITED STATES WOULD PROBABLY NOT BUILD A LARGE NEW LAND-BASED ICBM TO MATCH THE SOVIET THROW-WEIGHT BUILDUP. (END TEXT.) SISCO

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## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 01 JAN 1994  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 06 JUL 1974  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** n/a  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** n/a  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:**  
**Disposition Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1974STATE146151  
**Document Source:** CORE  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** HBREARD:SAC  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** N/A  
**Errors:** N/A  
**Film Number:** D740180-0322  
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**Legacy Key:** link1974/newtext/t19740770/aaaacibx.tel  
**Line Count:** 231  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN PA  
**Original Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 5  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** martinjw  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 24 JUN 2002  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <24 JUN 2002 by thomasv0>; APPROVED <15 JAN 2003 by martinjw>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** PRESS MATERIAL  
**TAGS:** OVIP, (KISSINGER)  
**To:** MUNICH  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005